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ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND SEVENTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 13 August 1964, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

U SAIN BWA

(Burma)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. CORREA do LAGO
Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV
Mr. G. GHELEV
Mr. G. YANKOV
Mr. I. BOEV

Burma:

U SAIN BWA
U HTOON SHEIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. J.F.M. BELL
Mr. R.M. TAIT
Mr. C.J. MARSHALL

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. K. KURKA
Mr. M. KLUSAK
Mr. V. VAJNAR
Mr. A. MIKULIN

Ethiopia:

Lij Mikael IMRU
Ato S. TEFERRA

India:

Mr. R.K. NEHRU
Mr. K.P. LUKOSE
Mr. K. NARENDRANATH

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. R. GUIDOTTI
Mr. S. AVETTA
Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO

Mr. M. TELLO

Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. LOBODYCZ

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. H. SOKALSKI

Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. I. IACOB

Mr. V. CONSTANTINESCU

Sweden:

Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD

Mr. U. ERICSSON

Mr. B. VEGESACK

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. L.I. MENDELYEVICH

Mr. A.A. RYABYKOV

Mr. I.M. PALENYKH

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN

Mr. A. OSMAN

Mr. M. KASSEM

Mr. A.A. SALAM

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN

Mr. A.J. WILLIAMS

Miss E.J.M. RICHARDSON

Mr. R.C. BEETHAM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United States of America:

Mr. C.H. TIMBERLAKE

Mr. S. de PALMA

Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Burma): I declare open the 207th meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. HASSAN (United Arab Republic): Although the topic for today's discussion is the cut-off of production of fissionable material for weapon uses, nevertheless, having listened with great interest to the exchange of views between the two sides recently on the subject of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, I should like this morning to state the position of my delegation on that important subject.

Our intervention in connexion with this matter is motivated by three main considerations.

First, the question of non-dissemination, while affecting international peace and security, has a direct bearing on the security of small States, which therefore have a vital and special interest in sharing in the debate on this question and stating their views regarding it.

Secondly, our intervention is in line with a resolution adopted by the African summit conference of Heads of State and Government held in Cairo from 15 to 21 July 1964. In that resolution the Heads of African States and Governments, conscious of their responsibility towards their peoples and their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and the charter of the Organization of African Unity, and deeply concerned with the disastrous effects resulting from the dissemination of nuclear weapons, have among other things solemnly declared their readiness to undertake in an international treaty, to be concluded under the auspices of the United Nations, not to manufacture or acquire control of nuclear weapons. The resolution called upon all peace-loving nations to adhere to the same undertaking.

Thirdly, our intervention is in response to the request made by the nuclear Powers parties to this Conference to the eight non-aligned countries to contribute to the debate with the aim of widening the areas of agreement.

Indeed, the discussions we have had in this Committee so far on the question of non-dissemination, the particular circumstances surrounding it and the irremediable and disastrous consequences which would follow if the present tacit embargo on dissemination were broken, compel us to pause for a long time when confronted with the problem of dissemination and the difficulties blocking the way to its solution. It might be helpful in our search for a possible way out to endeavour to place the problem in a

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clearer perspective by reviewing the stated positions of both sides on the question of non-dissemination. This might enable us to overcome the stalemate in our deliberations on this important question. We find great encouragement for our move in this respect in the clarity and decisiveness of the positions of both parties, as well as in the attitude of the United Nations General Assembly and world public opinion towards the idea of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons.

Both nuclear Powers provide, in their respective draft treaties on general and complete disarmament, provisions for preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons. Both parties equally have stressed, in this Committee and on the highest level, the importance and urgency of the problem of preventing wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. Statements by both sides are not lacking, and their vigorous stands against dissemination are quite eloquent. As an example, let me quote what the late President Kennedy said in his address of 26 July 1963 on the signature of the partial test-ban treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1). He said:

"During the next several years, in addition to the four current nuclear Powers, a small but significant number of nations will have the intellectual, physical, and financial resources to produce both nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them." (ENDC/102, p.5)

President Kennedy also stated:

"... this treaty can be a step towards preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to nations not now possessing them." (ibid.)

The official position of the United States was summed up in this Conference when Mr. Foster said at our meeting of 2 July:

"... the United States has been seeking, and will continue to seek, an international agreement under which the nuclear Powers would commit themselves not to transfer nuclear weapons into national control of States not now possessing them, as well as not to assist such States in manufacturing nuclear weapons." (ENDC/PV.195, pp. 34, 35)

As regards the Eastern point of view, we find that the Government of the Soviet Union in its memorandum presented to this Conference stated:

"As the stocks of nuclear weapons increase, and the methods of manufacturing them are improved, and as ever new types of such weapons are being devised, the question of preventing their further dissemination becomes increasingly important." (ENDC/123, p.4)

(Mr. Nassan, United Arab Republic)

Mr. Zorin reiterated on 2 July the position of his Government regarding the conclusion of such an agreement when he said:

"... we have mentioned ... that we are prepared to conclude an agreement and are prepared to negotiate on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons on the basis which we have set forth in detail." (ENDC/PV.195, p.40)

Then he went on to say:

"We said that it was necessary to conclude such an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons as would preclude any possibility for [their] dissemination, and would close every loophole of access to these weapons to those who do not now possess them but are striving at all costs to gain direct or at least indirect access to them, either by establishing their own national control over nuclear weapons or by participating within the framework of military alliances in the possession, disposition and control of them." (ibid.)

From the preceding review two conclusions emerge clearly. First, both sides realize the dangers inherent in the spread of nuclear weapons, and are therefore in accord on the importance, necessity and urgency of the question of non-dissemination. Second, both sides have shown their ardent desire and eagerness to reach an agreement before it is too late.

While welcoming such a policy and such a tendency on the part of the nuclear Powers, we have to express our deep regret that the way towards an appropriate international agreement has been blocked by a sudden obstacle: the multilateral nuclear force. We sincerely believe that, when the tides appear to be running so strong in the direction of non-dissemination, it would indeed be a pity if we failed to exert the utmost efforts to reach a compromise solution which would reconcile the positions of both sides with the general and determined aim of humanity in this respect. One could ask whether we should stand still and watch the existing embargo on dissemination crack under the pressure of a multitude of factors and circumstances. Such a possibility will become a fact if this Conference allows non-dissemination to remain an unachieved goal, while the atmosphere both inside and outside the Committee is so favourable to that goal. The matter calls for immediate action on our part.

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

Today I wish to offer some fresh ideas regarding desirable action to be taken without delay. However, before spelling out those suggestions, we have to address ourselves to the main obstacle to an international agreement on non-dissemination and try to assess its proper role in our discussions.

Disagreement on the multilateral nuclear force has its sources in a number of historical, political, military and psychological considerations which, while having a bearing on the attitudes of both sides towards the multilateral nuclear force, should nevertheless be relegated to their proper places within the sphere of over-all relations between East and West. As we are discussing the particular issue of non-dissemination, we should limit ourselves to the aspects of the multilateral nuclear force which pertain to non-dissemination. Viewed from that angle, the impasse can be summed up in one single sentence: does the multilateral nuclear force envisaged within the NATO alliance constitute an act of dissemination, and therefore become objectionable, or not? Unfortunately the answer to that question is not so simple, for both sides hold conflicting views in that regard.

On the one hand, our Western colleagues emphasize that the arrangements made or contemplated for the multilateral force would not increase the number of independent nuclear weapon capabilities and are thus consistent with their objective of preventing the spread of such capabilities. Moreover, they believe that, by offering an alternative to national nuclear weapons, the multilateral nuclear force should increase incentives and improve chances for the limitation of national weapon-producing centres.

It might be useful to take note of what Mr. Timberlake said in this respect on 23 July:

"The multilateral force will contribute to meeting this threat in a way which avoids the creation of new national centres of control over nuclear weapons. As we have made clear many times, it is fully consistent with United States policy against proliferation. No single participant would be able to fire the missiles, since firing of missiles in war-time would be by decision of the United States and an agreed number of other participants. Furthermore, no nation participating in the multilateral force could withdraw any element of the force and place it under national control." (ENDC/PV.201, p.33)

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On the other hand, our colleagues from the socialist countries find that the establishment of a multilateral nuclear force would not be compatible with the idea of non-dissemination, as they think that it would allow access to nuclear weapons by countries not possessing them, and that therefore there would be no sense in concluding an agreement on non-dissemination before solving the problem of dissemination raised by the creation of the multilateral force.

It seems, therefore, that the differences boil down to an issue of interpretation. Does the multilateral force constitute a dissemination of nuclear weapons or not? Are the fingers of the participating States on the firing trigger or on the safety catch? What is to be the eventual development of the multilateral-force system, and what legitimate apprehensions can it provoke for the future? Will it be a stepping-stone to wider dissemination, and how can the door be closed to such an eventuality? Will ownership and control of multilateral-force weapons be confined exclusively to the United States?

We can only trust the United States declarations -- coming from official sources which, I am sure, are aware of the responsibility of such declarations -- to the effect that the multilateral force will not lead to dissemination. However, as has often been pointed out in this Committee, in such vital matters one party cannot take another party's word for granted. Therefore we cannot but emphasize the importance of considering very carefully the concern and anxiety expressed by our Eastern colleagues regarding the impact of the creation of the multilateral nuclear force on the concept of non-dissemination.

In the light of previous developments, which clearly show that the principle of non-dissemination not only is desired by both sides but has also been agreed upon, my delegation submits for consideration the following three measures which might overcome the obstacles to agreement:

(1) The nuclear Powers should engage in negotiations with a view to issuing a declaration on non-dissemination, based on the Irish resolution (A/RES/1665 (XVI)), which will bar any access to nuclear weapons and in which both sides undertake to refrain from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons, from transmitting the information necessary for their manufacture to States not possessing such weapons, and from transferring the weapons themselves to those States.

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(2) Parallel to the negotiations on the declaration, the nuclear Powers might engage in a discussion of a technical nature in a body of experts, which in our opinion might be in a better practical position to state whether the multilateral force leads to dissemination and whether the fingers of the other States are on the firing trigger or on the safety catch. Pending the result of the work of that technical body, in order to facilitate the discussion, the existing arrangements should not be developed beyond the present stage, and both sides should refrain from taking any action which might jeopardize the success of an eventual agreement on non-dissemination. That technical discussion would of course be limited to a reasonable time or have a fixed target date.

(3) The declaration of the nuclear Powers should be transformed in due course into an appropriate international treaty to be concluded under the auspices of the United Nations, one to which it would be open to all States to become parties.

We are confident that the negotiations on the proposed declaration on non-dissemination would be successful, and that the technical discussions on the multilateral force would be satisfactory enough to pave the way for the transformation of the declaration into an international treaty. Thereby we should be closing the door completely to the dissemination of nuclear weapons. Of course, an escape clause, which would be provided in the declaration, would come into effect, if need be, to safeguard the interests of both sides.

Those three ideas constitute, in our assessment, a possible method of moving forward and finding a way out of the existing situation. In putting them forward we are acting in accordance with the Irish resolution (A/RES/1665 (XVI)), which called upon all States "to use their best endeavours to secure the conclusion" of such an agreement and "to co-operate to those ends". In presenting those ideas we have tried to be helpful in widening the areas of understanding for any private talks that the two parties might hold on the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons -- a matter which has been referred to at our previous meetings.

In suggesting the issuing of a declaration by the nuclear Powers now, we have in view the materialization of what both sides have been urging: that is, the achievement of a joint effort based on the existing points of contact in the positions

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of both sides. We believe that such a declaration would be useful and necessary as a provisional measure until we can reach a final and appropriate agreement. The practical effects of the undertakings of the nuclear Powers stated in the declaration should minimize the danger which lies in the non-participation of the non-nuclear States at this stage. Moreover, such a declaration would not include any kind of inspection or control: in other words, it would be made in the same spirit as that of the partial test-ban treaty.

The idea of establishing a technical body is offered by us because it seems to us that the real answer to the question of whether the multilateral force would or would not lead to dissemination is a technical one. A competent technical body would be an appropriate forum to give an effective answer to that question. Besides, if we let the charges and counter-charges continue, we shall have merely polemics, and it will not lead to proving whether or not the multilateral nuclear force is a means of dissemination of nuclear weapons.

If the political will exists, and if the two parties concerned refrain from lingering over their political divergences, the creation of such a technical body will not prejudice the position of either party. On the contrary, we strongly feel that it would be in the interest of the nuclear Powers to participate in such a body, since it is most probable that in such a technical body the discussions would produce more light than heat.

If I have taken so much of the time of the Committee to expose, in a somewhat elaborate way, a method of overcoming the difficulty standing in the way of a non-dissemination agreement, it is because we want to avert, while we still have the time and the opportunity, the disastrous consequences which will follow if proliferation of nuclear weapons becomes a fact.

That brings me to a matter of the greatest concern to my Government. The latest incidents in our part of the world make us wonder what would have happened if some countries had been in a position -- by way of any arrangement, whether multilateral or otherwise -- to acquire nuclear weapons which might be used against innocent villagers. This emphasizes what the late President Kennedy said almost a year ago in his address on the concluding of the partial test-ban treaty:

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"I ask you to stop and think for a moment what it would mean to have nuclear weapons in many hands -- in the hands of countries large and small, stable and unstable, responsible and irresponsible, scattered through the world. There would be no rest for anyone then, no stability, no real security and no chance of effective disarmament. There would only be increased chances of accidental war ..." (ENDC/102, p.5)

All these recent developments prove one thing: that every delay in coming to grips with the collateral measures presented to the Conference will only lead to further tensions, especially in the light of the current complicated international situation. While expressing my Government's concern at the present situation, I think that this should be an incentive for the Committee to shoulder its responsibility and exert relentless efforts to secure agreement on some of the collateral measures aimed at reducing the armaments race and at lessening international tension. Indeed, I find it rather difficult to sit here taking part in a debate on disarmament in isolation from the flaring-up of the international situation.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): As you all know, the present session of the Conference opened with favourable prospects. We were confident that some agreements -- even limited ones -- would be feasible during this session. The atmosphere of our work, relaxed and oriented towards collaboration, soon confirmed and encouraged these hopes. Now our session is approaching its close; but unfortunately we do not seem to be within sight of even one limited agreement.

The atmosphere of our meetings has been serene. The existence of sincere good will and of a spirit of compromise has been asserted on both sides. The delegations of the Eight have done their best, by submitting very valuable new ideas and concrete proposals in regard to several questions. Nevertheless, it would be rash to say that we are within sight of agreements on certain matters and that we shall be able to conclude them before the end of this session. As I see it, that is unfortunately the situation in regard to many of the questions listed on our agenda.

The representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Hassan, has spoken to us this morning about non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, and he appears to nourish some hope that progress can be made in that field. His speech merits our full attention, and we shall study it with the deepest interest.

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Mr. Hassan spoke of a difference of interpretation between the Soviet and Western delegations in regard to the multilateral force. May I point out that the Soviet delegation's interpretation is a negative one? It relates to studies which are under way, which have not been concluded, which are secret, which cannot be known to anyone in detail -- indeed, I am not fully acquainted with them myself.

On our side, the situation is different. So far as we are concerned, there is no question of interpretation, for our Governments have in full responsibility assumed a solemn obligation to the effect that the multilateral force cannot and must not involve dissemination of nuclear weapons. That is why the Soviet delegation's attitude on this subject appears to be rigid, intransigent, and devoid of any real foundation. As far as we are concerned, the position is clear. We are willing to conclude a non-dissemination agreement at once, even during the present session.

Without of course abandoning all hope of a speedy agreement on non-dissemination, there is one among the numerous measures proposed which, in my delegation's view, still offers favourable prospects. It is a question on which we should definitely make a fresh effort to come to an understanding, for it is perhaps the only one on which we might be able to conclude an agreement even before the end of this session. I refer to a cut-off of production of fissionable materials for military purposes. I have several reasons for believing that definite progress could be made on this problem in a relatively short time.

In the first place, all the delegations present unanimously agree that we must apply and develop the spirit of the Moscow Treaty. A cut-off would be a first logical consequence of that Treaty. If we undertake to restrict the qualitative development of the bomb, we should at the same time make a beginning in halting its production.

Secondly, the recent decisions of the United States (ENDC/132) and Soviet Union (ENDC/131) Governments refer specifically to a decrease in production of fissionable materials for military purposes. That raises the possibility that a more far-reaching measure, such as a cut-off, would not affect the essential security interests of the two parties or upset the balance.

On 25 June the Czechoslovak representative, Mr. Kurka, speaking of a halt in production of fissionable materials for military purposes, said: "It is obvious that

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at the present time there are already more than sufficient quantities of these materials." (ENDC/PV.193, p.44) That hypothesis may well be correct, but it should not hinder an agreement on a cut-off. That situation is common to both sides. We have never heard it said, here or elsewhere, that the Soviet Union has a shortage of fissionable materials for military purposes. All the statements made by the Soviet leaders induce us to believe the opposite; at any rate, they do not indicate that the Soviet Union lacks fissionable materials for military purposes. That is indeed confirmed by the recent spontaneous decision of the Soviet Government to decrease appreciably the production of such materials.

If that is indeed the case, if there is a de facto balance in this field, what prevents the Soviet Union from making the gesture awaited by us and concluding an agreement on a total halt of production of fissionable materials for military purposes? Such a decision would be of incalculable value. An agreement on a cut-off could have practical consequences going far beyond the specific field of the production of fissionable materials.

I should like to recall in that connexion an idea submitted on 6 August by the Brazilian representative:

"We think that the Committee could entrust that task to a working group whenever it considered that certain collateral measures could be studied jointly. For instance, we might seek to combine the study of the 'principles' of reducing military budgets and of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons -- which we all support -- with that of 'concrete measures' for a decrease in production of fissionable materials for military purposes, the destruction of bomber aircraft and a freeze of nuclear delivery vehicles, all of which we are at present discussing separately. We might also study these measures by seeking means of using at once, for peaceful purposes, the savings resulting from the elimination or reduction of those instruments of destruction." (ENDC/PV.205,p.20)

The link which the Brazilian representative sought to establish between a cut-off on the one hand and the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons and a reduction in military budgets on the other, merits particular attention and could lead to highly interesting developments. An agreement to halt production of fissionable materials for military

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purposes could indeed set in motion a far-reaching and beneficial process by facilitating the solution of other problems. If the nuclear Powers undertook to cease producing fissionable materials for military purposes, and if this agreement were open to all, it can easily be anticipated that a large number of States would accede to it -- at least as many as acceded to the Moscow Treaty on nuclear weapon tests. States which, while technically able to produce fissionable materials for military purposes, are not yet doing so would undertake never to initiate such production. Thus a general agreement on a cut-off would serve as a guarantee against the dissemination of nuclear weapons, and the Brazilian representative was quite right to establish a link between the two measures.

For their part, the Eastern delegations stress the urgency of nuclear disarmament, and sometimes accuse the Western delegations of not being sufficiently aware of the gravity and urgency of this problem. If, as we should like to believe, the Eastern delegations are really sincere in their anxiety, why will they not accept certain undertakings which -- like the cut-off -- constitute a necessary preliminary to any form of nuclear disarmament? Can those delegations really imagine a nuclear disarmament which would leave States free to produce materials intended for the thermocuclear bomb? A cut-off is therefore a sine qua non for a reduction and subsequent elimination of the nuclear threat.

The next step would be the reduction of existing stocks with a view to their step-by-step and eventually their total elimination. Regarding that latter measure, it is well to recall that concrete proposals have been submitted which await acceptance by the Eastern delegations (ENDC/PV.191, pp. 7 et seq.)

Concerning a halt in the production of fissionable materials for military purposes, there remains, it is true, the difficulty of control. We know that the Soviet delegation makes serious reservations in this connexion. Its arguments are well known, and can be summed up as follows: since the cut-off is a "freeze" and does not involve destruction of armaments, there can be no question of control. We regard that as a very weak argument, which takes no account of the importance of measures making for a halt in the arms race. Of course, those measures call for binding mutual guarantees of faithful and thorough implementation.

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Furthermore, we have already stated -- and we stress it yet again -- that there are certain contradictions in the Soviet delegation's position in this matter. The Soviet delegation proposes controls for a certain freeze measure suggested by the East (ENDC/PV.176, p.10). In that particular case the Soviet delegation does not object to inspection. Yet it considers inadmissible any investigation into the implementation of the freeze measures proposed by the United States delegation.

The details of verification of a cut-off will in any case have to be the subject of negotiations. The West has often asserted that the control of freeze measures should be limited and confined to what is strictly necessary. If the Soviet delegation does not regard as acceptable the control proposals submitted by the United States delegation (ENDC/134), it can make its own suggestions. Thus there would be material for the study group, which could examine both sides' proposals and could easily find a concrete solution to the difficulties of control.

If this task turned out to be rather lengthy, a study group created before the end of this session could very well continue to work during our Conference's recess and report to our next session. If, in our report to the United Nations General Assembly, we could announce that all the delegations in the Committee had recognized the value of a cut-off and that an ad hoc working group had been created to study its practical application, our Committee would be submitting a positive document which would show that our efforts here had been far from fruitless.

Both in his speeches here and in private conversations, Mr. Tsarapkin has always appeared to desire to conclude some sort of agreement during this session. I also gained the impression that the Soviet delegation does not completely and finally deny the value of an agreement to halt the production of fissionable materials for military purposes. While raising certain objections, it is true, Mr. Tsarapkin has not so far uttered an irrevocable "No". If I venture to insist on this subject, it is because the door still seems to me to be open or, at least, ajar.

Mr. Tsarapkin should **bear in mind** that even the beginnings of an agreement on a cut-off would be a victory for peace and for the cause of step-by-step elimination of the nuclear threat. Let us remember the happy and favourable consequences and repercussions of the agreements so far concluded. Let us not overlook the immense psychological value of even a limited agreement -- or the beginnings of an agreement --

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in improving the general political situation and re-establishing mutual confidence. It is for the Soviet delegation to speak. We await its reply with some trepidation, but also with some hope.

Let this session of our Conference be marked by a halt in the production of fissionable materials for military purposes, just as the last one was marked by a decrease in such production and the 1963 session by a ban on nuclear tests in the three media. Such is my delegation's hope at this stage of our discussions, for we are confident that the Committee will make a fresh effort to conclude during this session an agreement to halt the production of fissionable materials for military purposes.

Mr. TIMBERLAKE (United States of America): First I should like to say that the United States Government welcomes the important initiative on the part of the member Governments of the Organization of African Unity which was brought to our attention this morning by the representative of the United Arab Republic. This is a hopeful further step towards the objective of stopping the spread of nuclear weapons. The Organization of African Unity resolution is a gratifying response to the will of the United Nations as expressed unanimously in the Irish resolution (A/RES/1665 (XVI)) adopted by the General Assembly. The Organization of African Unity has thus given concrete evidence of the united African desire to progress on the road to international peace and security. The Organization of African Unity resolution and the long-established United States policy of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons are clearly in harmony.

I shall, of course, want to study carefully Mr. Hassan's further remarks concerning non-dissemination. At this time, however, let me simply state again the policy of the United States on this question.

In recognition of the grave threat to the security and peace of all nations, large and small, nuclear and non-nuclear, of the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, the United States for its part does not intend to take any actions inconsistent with the terms of the Irish resolution. That is the declared policy of the United States. That policy is clearly relevant to that part of the Organization of African Unity resolution which calls upon all nuclear Powers to respect and abide by the Organization of African Unity members' declaration of their readiness to undertake in an international treaty not to manufacture or acquire control of nuclear weapons. The United States Government

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may be counted upon to play a responsive and constructive role in future consideration of the means of achieving the goal of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, a goal which we share in common with the members of the Organization of African Unity.

Now let me turn to the subject with which I propose to deal today.

It has often been said at this Conference that the most pressing problem before us is the threat posed by nuclear weapons. On this we all agree, I believe. It is essential, therefore, that we develop and agree on ways and means of reducing that threat. The cut-off in production of fissionable materials for weapon use is a measure which the United States believes would limit that threat. Moreover, we believe that it would provide a basis for further steps which will have to be taken if the threat is to be finally eliminated. It is therefore a measure which we consider to be of great importance.

In his letter (ENDC/120) of 21 January to this Conference, President Johnson proposed the cut-off as one of five potential points of agreement. To the United States there seemed to be a reasonable prospect that progress in this direction was possible. Today we believe this even more strongly.

First, we have already witnessed an encouraging initial step -- I refer to the independent announcements made last April by the major nuclear Powers concerning a cut-back in fissionable material production (ENDC/131, 132). It was our hope then, as it is now, that this cut-back would serve as a preliminary step towards a possible verified cut-off agreement.

Secondly, research undertaken by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency made it clear that the verification requirements in the case of a cut-off could be limited in scope. One important reason for that is that under a cut-off, as a separable measure, the risk of small diversions of fissionable material is less significant than it would be under general disarmament.

Third, there is flexibility in the manner in which the cut-off could be executed. There are options to be exercised. These permit the parties concerned to select any one of several methods of halting production which seems best in the light of their security needs. The cut-off, for example, can be so devised as to be immediate and total. Or it can be approached gradually on the basis of a plant-by-plant shut-down, leading eventually to a complete cut-off.

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And finally, we are approaching -- if we have not already attained -- a degree of balance and mutuality of interest which permits the nuclear Powers to undertake this step immediately. This is a practical and necessary measure. Military, political and economic considerations combine to reinforce this conclusion.

What, then, would constitute an agreement on a separable, verified cut-off in the production of fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons? The essential obligations are few. Each party would have to agree to these basic undertakings:

- (a) To halt, prohibit and prevent the production of fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons at all facilities under its jurisdiction and control;
- (b) To refrain from rendering assistance to anyone for the purpose of production anywhere of fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons; and
- (c) To accept appropriate inspection.

In addition, to protect the vital interests of all concerned, the agreement should contain a provision for withdrawal which could be similar to that of the limited test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1).

In enumerating these undertakings, I would direct special attention to the matter of inspection, which all too frequently is thought to be the bogey-man in our disarmament efforts. As I have stated, inspection is mandatory. Its scope, however, is dictated by the necessity to guard against any significant diversions of fissionable materials. The system we envisage for the cut-off would be precise and limited in scope. It would recognize the desire to protect the sensitive facilities of the inspected parties.

The inspection system we advocate has been described in some detail in the statement made by Mr. Foster on 25 June (ENDC/PV.193, pp.10 et seq.) and in a working paper (ENDC/134) submitted to this Conference. However, I should like to stress again the limited extent of the inspection required.

Following appropriate declarations concerning identification, location and production activities of facilities involved in the agreement, three kinds of inspection would be undertaken. One type would ensure that closed plants remained closed; another would check against diversion or over-production at operating plants; and the last would check on illegal or clandestine production. For those facilities which have been completely shut down, an initial inspection would be required to verify that production had, in fact, ceased. Thereafter, only occasional inspections would be required to confirm the shut-down.

(Mr. Timberlake, United States)

To check allowed production at declared facilities, methods would differ depending on the kind of plant involved. In the case of U-235 separation plants, ground access at the perimeters of processing plants would suffice. Operating reactors could be inspected under International Atomic Energy Agency procedures. Only in the case of chemical-separation plants would inspection require complete access to the facilities at all times. This is necessary since the possible products of chemical separation -- which are plutonium, U-233 and enriched uranium fuel -- are potentially useful in weapons. Should this prove difficult to accept, a substitute inspection procedure could be adopted. A nuclear Power could instead place under international safeguards an amount of the same type of fissionable material equal to that to be processed in the chemical-separation plant.

The third category -- undeclared facilities which could be engaged in illegal production -- would be subject to a limited number of inspections. These inspections would be on an adversary basis. They would require internal access to the suspected facility. But, in the case of a particularly sensitive installation, an agreed external inspection procedure would probably be sufficient.

I would also point out that, should the cut-off be initiated through a plant-by-plant shut-down, inspection could be even more limited than in the case of an immediate and complete cut-off. Verification, in this case, might well be confined in the beginning to the specific plants involved in the shut-down.

Let me emphasize that in no instance would there be inspection of mines. Nor would there be inspection of refineries. Nor would existing nuclear weapon stockpiles be inspected.

In brief, we have sought to avoid excessive intrusion. I believe a careful study of the United States working paper will bear this out. The important point is that the inspection system we have proposed for the cut-off is designed simply and solely to provide a high degree of assurance that no significant increase in nuclear stockpiles could result from violations of the agreement.

I hope that all delegations, and particularly the Soviet delegation, will give the system we have proposed the same careful study as we have given it. We have had lengthy discussions of verification requirements more or less in the abstract. Now we have an opportunity to examine a specific system for a particular measure. I am certain that close study of our proposal will confirm both its practicality and its reasonableness.

(Mr. Timberlake, United States)

As I said at the outset of my remarks, the United States believes the cut-off to be of special importance. There are telling reasons why this is the case.

First, a limit would be placed on the quantity of fissionable material available for nuclear weapons. A cut-off agreement could also open the door to a reduction of fissionable materials for weapon use. The transfer of fissionable material from the stockpiles of nuclear explosives to non-weapon use is a natural companion measure to a cut-off agreement.

The United States has already stated its willingness to transfer a sizable quantity of weapon-grade U-235 to non-weapon purposes (ENDC/109). We are prepared, in the event of a cut-off, to transfer 50,000 kilogrammes of that material to non-weapon use should a similar transfer be made by the Soviet Union (ENDC/PV.191, p.9). Furthermore, we have indicated our willingness to consider transferring a larger amount than the Soviet Union if the latter felt our original proposal was inequitable. We have suggested a transfer of 60,000 kilogrammes by the United States to 40,000 kilogrammes by the Soviet Union (*ibid.*). In this way we could move towards limiting the dangers posed by the nuclear weapons of today and the potential weapons of tomorrow.

Moreover, a cut-off would definitely decrease the pressure other nations may now feel to produce or acquire nuclear weapons. If tied to a transfer, this would further restrict proliferation by limiting presently-available amounts of fissionable material. An agreed cut-off by the major nuclear Powers would signify to others a real intent to come to grips with the threat posed by nuclear weapons. In this connexion, I would add that we should wish to consider the accession of non-nuclear Powers to the cut-off agreement. Finally, an agreed cut-off, particularly if it were coupled with a transfer, could give an added impetus towards meeting the opportunities for the peaceful use of the atom. Science, medicine and mankind as a whole would be the beneficiaries.

In sum, the United States believes that a halt in the production of fissionable material is practicable. We believe it can be made effective. We believe it is a logical move if action is to be taken to halt the nuclear arms race.

The United States has now explained two significant approaches towards reducing the nuclear threat. The strategic nuclear delivery vehicle proposal would freeze the number and characteristics of nuclear weapon carriers. The other measure would cut off the production of fissionable material available for nuclear bombs and

(Mr. Timberlake, United States)

warheads. These are complementary measures. If they are put into effect, significant reductions can be made in the present threat to civilization which modern weapons of war present.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Having listened this morning to the statement made by the United States representative, Mr. Timberlake, on the question of a cut-off of production of fissionable material for military purposes, we should like to make a few observations.

In connexion with a cut-off of production of fissionable materials, there is bound to arise an extremely complicated problem which, it must be said quite frankly, is insoluble in the absence of an agreement on general and complete disarmament. We refer to the problem of control over the execution of this measure.

The crux of the matter is that here it is a question of establishing control without disarmament. In its statements concerning a cut-off of production of fissionable materials for military purposes at the meeting of 25 June (ENDC/PV.193, pp.10 et seq.) and at today's meeting, the United States delegation has been inclined to minimize the importance of the difficulties to which we have just referred, by attempting to represent the control proposed by the United States over the implementation of this measure as very simple and limited to the sole function of verifying the fulfilment by States of their commitments to discontinue the production of fissionable materials for military purposes.

Let us see how the fulfilment of this function would work out in practice, if we examine the working paper submitted by the United States delegation on this subject (ENDC/134) and consider also the statements made by the United States representative in this regard.

Let us take, first of all, that provision in the working paper which states that each nuclear power will declare at the outset "by individual identification and location, all U-235 separation plants, chemical separation plants, and reactors", and also the nature of the production of fissionable material required for allowed uses and schedules for production at each operating facility. Anyone reading those words in the working paper will naturally ask himself what this means in practice. In practice it means that, in a situation where no measures of disarmament are being

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carried out, when there are tremendous stockpiles of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the nuclear Powers and, consequently, when the threat of thermonuclear war still exists, States would have to submit such information as would enable the other side to ascertain the location of all plants producing uranium-235 and plutonium -- that is, the basic materials for the production of nuclear weapons. It is not difficult to see how seriously this would affect the security of States.

But this is by no means all. The provisions of the working paper concerning the nature and extent of the inspection of atomic facilities also turn out to be not so simple and limited as the United States representative, Mr. Timberlake, has tried to make out today. The inspection measures proposed by the United States delegation make it possible not only to establish the volume of the current production of uranium-235 and plutonium, but also to ascertain the volume of the nuclear resources stockpiled by States. This follows directly from those provisions in the working paper which provide for the access of inspectors to all basic data connected with the operation of plants producing fissionable materials (direct access to the plants, the measurements of the energy used, and so on).

Moreover, the inspection proposed by the United States would make it possible to ascertain the volume of the stockpiles of individual types of nuclear weapons in the possession of States, and in any case the volume of the stockpiles of nuclear weapons based on uranium-235 and the volume of the stockpiles of such weapons based on plutonium. Furthermore, the visits by inspectors to the atomic plants subject to control under the United States proposal would reveal the whole technology of the production of nuclear materials. All this -- as you yourselves are bound to realize, gentlemen -- represents extremely important and strictly-guarded information relating to the most intrinsic interests of State security.

Further, the United States working paper contains a provision regarding the right to withdraw from the agreement to discontinue the production of fissionable materials. Moreover, the State which wished to withdraw would merely have to declare that it was not satisfied with the data submitted by the other side on its atomic industry. This provision in the working paper in fact makes it possible for

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one side, after obtaining information about the quantity, production capacities and locations of the atomic plants of the other side, to refer to this provision of the treaty and to withdraw from the agreement -- that is, to refuse to carry out the agreement once it had received the information of interest to it and wished to use this information for purposes having nothing to do with the maintenance of peace. It is obvious that no State concerned with its security and not harbouring any plans directed against the security of the other side could accept such an agreement without relinquishing very important, very serious interests of its people.

Those are the ideas which inevitably arise in connexion both with Mr. Foster's statement at the meeting on 25 June (ENDC/PV.193, pp.10 et seq.) and Mr. Timberlake's statement this morning, and also in connexion with the United States working paper on a cut-off of production of fissionable materials for military purposes. In the light of the aforesaid considerations, we doubt whether attempts to solve this problem outside the framework of general and complete disarmament could lead to any useful results. It is self-evident that the achievement of agreement on general and complete disarmament would also solve the problem of a cut-off of production of fissionable materials for military purposes together with the establishment of the necessary control over the implementation of that measure. But unfortunately there is as yet no agreement on general and complete disarmament, and so far we have not even come anywhere near it.

The Soviet delegation would now like to revert to the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons which is on the agenda of the Committee as an extremely important and most urgent question requiring an immediate solution. To revert to this question at today's meeting is necessary, above all, in order to dispel the fog which the United States representative spread over certain well-known facts at the meeting of 30 July (ENDC/PV.203, pp.50 et seq.) I have

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in mind in particular Mr. Timberlake's attempt to create the impression that the recent agreement between the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to transmit secret nuclear information to other members of NATO should not be regarded as conducing to the dissemination of nuclear weapons.

In this connexion I should like to recall that in the TASS statement of 27 July circulated by the Secretariat as an official document of the Eighteen-Nation Committee (ENDC/138) the true significance of this agreement between the United States and NATO was revealed. The agreement will in particular widen transmission of the information required for "developing the necessary atomic weapon delivery systems" -- that is, information that will enable the allies of the United States to adapt their missiles and other combat weapons for fitting with nuclear warheads. The agreement shows that military personnel of the allies of the United States are being instructed in the handling of nuclear weapons, are being given access to the plans for the use of nuclear weapons and to data containing "an evaluation of the capabilities of potential enemies in regard to the use of nuclear weapons", and are being acquainted with United States scientific and technical documents concerning nuclear missile systems and so on.

From all this it is apparent, as mentioned in the TASS statement, that if the United States of America is still not directly handing over nuclear weapons to its allies, it is preparing them for the possession of such weapons and for their use within the briefest periods and at their convenience.

No matter how hard Mr. Timberlake tried to depict the new agreement between the United States of America and NATO regarding the transmission of nuclear information in an innocuous light, nevertheless he could not avoid admitting the true purpose of this agreement. He said:

"... this information is needed to enable our allies to make effective use of nuclear delivery systems^{1/} being provided by the United States under bilateral procedures and agreements." (ENDC/PV.203, page 54)

^{1/} Words underlined by speaker.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

It is clear from these words of Mr. Timberlake that the United States is preparing its NATO allies -- and in the first place, of course, Western Germany -- for the effective use of nuclear weapons. We note that the aforementioned agreement between NATO and the United States under which the United States will make secret nuclear information available to other members of NATO is a new link in the chain of measures opening the way to further dissemination of nuclear weapons.

I should now like to refer to the statement made by the United States representative at our meeting of 30 July regarding the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons and the plan for the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force. The United States representative tried to give a very peculiar twist to the question; he tried to cover up its peace-endangering aspect and to give to the whole of this affair a sentimental rather than a political character. Mr. Timberlake made a speech asserting that our criticisms, our decisive objections to the plan for the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force, our warnings about the danger of bringing nuclear weapons within the reach of the West German revenge-seekers, could be explained by the fact that the Soviet Union is guided in this matter by "bitter memories" (ibid., p.52), and, as Mr. Timberlake put it, by "outmoded punitive concepts which history has shown to be counterproductive". (ibid., p.51)

We do not intend to engage in polemics with Mr. Timberlake about "bitter memories", although the Soviet people, more than any other, have grounds for such bitterness. We deem it essential, however, to dwell on certain facts which determine and characterize the present situation and give an idea of what may be a dangerous development of events in the future if preventive measures are not taken. We shall cite only a few facts which show that, when it is a question of West German revenge-seekers to whom the United States wishes to grant access to nuclear weapons within the framework of a NATO multilateral

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force, it is not at all a matter of "bitter memories" of events dating back to the Second World War, but of political realities of the present day and the future plans of the German revenge-seekers. These political realities are sufficiently serious to justify that concern about the future development of events which is being felt by the peoples of the world. We shall adduce facts alone -- pronouncements and statements reflecting the political programme of the West German revenge-seekers, which has been put forward by them at the present time. We shall have little to say about these statements, since they speak for themselves.

In January 1960 Mr. Schröder, who was then Minister of the Interior of the Federal Republic of Germany and is now Minister for Foreign Affairs, said:

"Germany is a Federal Republic. The rest of Germany consists of the territories which have been torn away from it and which must be reunited to it."

In July 1960 Mr. Seeböhm, Minister of Transport of the Federal Republic of Germany, made the following statement explaining the attitude of certain West German circles towards the so-called "integration of Europe":

"Our purpose, our aim, is to do away with the frontiers between the Federal Republic of Germany and the nations of Europe, in order to gather strength and then to do away with the frontiers beyond the Iron Curtain. Yes, we wish to go our way with a clear view, ready to devote to it all that we have."

In June 1961 Mr. Stein, Minister of Labour for Bavaria, said:

"We must not forget that once again Germany needs greater Lebensraum. We do not have enough space. We can find this space in neighbouring countries which do not need it. On the other side of the frontiers, to the East, thinly-populated areas await us".

"Today there is not a single reasoning German" - said the Prime Minister of North Rhineland-Westphalia, Mr. Maier, "who in his efforts for re-unification is not thinking of the 1871 frontiers of the German Reich."

Here is another quotation:

"We are living in an age of technology when the joint efforts of our allies will be sufficient to wipe the empire of the Soviet Union off the map of the world."

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Those words were spoken as long ago as 1956 by the then West German Minister of Defence, Mr. Strauss. Subsequently Mr. Strauss has made similar statements in many different forms. Thus in November 1961 he declared:

"I share the opinion of Professor Beloff of the United States that sovereignty in the field of foreign policy consists essentially in the right and the ability to wage war."

Later, as is well known, he also spoke of the possession of nuclear weapons and the right to use them as being "the symbol, characteristic feature, and decisive criterion of sovereignty."

Mr. Strauss's successor, Mr. von Hassel, the present Minister of Defence of West Germany, wrote in the newspaper Deutsche Volkszeitung as far back as December 1961: "Our territorial claims extend far beyond the Oder-Neisse line. We wish to regain the former territories of the German State." Shortly afterwards Mr. von Hassel, referring to the fact that the Federal Republic of Germany had the second largest military contingent in NATO (after the United States), demanded that West Germany should have a corresponding "share in nuclear planning and nuclear responsibility".

Here is another, very recent, example which is probably familiar to those present in this hall. Speaking on 19 May at the Association of Sudeten Germans at Nuremberg, the same Mr. Seehofer whom I mentioned earlier put forward a demand for the revision of the State frontiers with Czechoslovakia, and asserted that the Munich Agreement of 1938 for the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia still retained its legal force and was "unimpeachable from an international point of view." You probably remember that after that statement by Mr. Seehofer the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany not only did not request him to resign, as was demanded by wide circles of world opinion, but expressed the hope that the Government of Czechoslovakia would adopt a "liberal" attitude towards that statement and revanchist demand.

We have taken at random just a few statements by prominent West German revenge-seekers, but we could continue such quotations indefinitely. The whole spirit of the political life of West Germany which is being instilled by those in power has a revenge-seeking character. This is dangerous -- dangerous from the point of view of the interests of peace, and from the point of view of the security of the States of Europe. Therefore, Mr. Timberlake, this is not a matter of memories of the past; it is above all a matter of the present and future development of events.

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The Soviet Union and the peoples of our country wish to maintain the very best businesslike relations with the Federal Republic of Germany, to develop and strengthen links with the people of that country. The Soviet Government has expressed itself to this effect on many occasions; it has done and continues to do a great deal to contribute towards the development of relations between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic in every way. We are, however, most decisively opposed to giving the West German revenge-seekers access to nuclear weapons. But this is precisely the policy that is being carried out by the United States: it is doing everything to enable the Federal German Republic to have access to weapons of mass destruction, and in fact it is organizing such access.

The whole world knows that the plan to create a NATO multilateral nuclear force was initiated in the United States in order to satisfy progressively, stage by stage and phase by phase, the claims of West Germany to possess nuclear weapons. It is very characteristic that the West German leaders cover up and camouflage their militarism, their policy of re-arming the West German Bundeswehr with nuclear missile weapons, by putting forward demands such as "equality of rights for Germany", the right of the German State to exercise "full sovereignty", and so on. In the Federal Republic of Germany it is being said in this connexion that to deprive the West German Bundeswehr of nuclear weapons, to deny the Bundeswehr access to nuclear weapons (at first through a NATO multilateral nuclear force), is incompatible with equality of rights for West Germany and is a restriction of its sovereignty.

This contrivance of the West German revenge-seekers is not a new one. It brings to mind the not so distant past when the German Nazis, using similar demagogic slogans to cover up their designs, did away with all the military limitations imposed on Germany after the First World War. We all remember that ominous period when the muddy waters of national jingoism raged in Hitler's Germany, when militarism came again into the forefront of German policy, when the re-armament of Hitler's Germany and its military preparations went on at an accelerated rate.

(Mr. Tsarankin. 15:10)

Something similar can be observed today in West Germany, whose leaders are carrying out a policy of militarism and, using the "arguments" and demagogic slogans I have mentioned regarding "equality of rights" and the "sovereignty" of West Germany, are steadfastly seeking to obtain access to nuclear weapons. Those who are facilitating and actively promoting the access by West Germany to nuclear weapons should not forget that any attempts, in whatever guise, to satisfy the persistent demands of the Federal Republic of Germany in regard to nuclear weapons are in fact tantamount to a further dissemination of nuclear weapons.

In such an event another question would immediately arise. No one could deny to other States the same right to such "equality of rights" and to such "full sovereignty" as is claimed by West Germany; and, basing themselves on similar arguments and considerations, they too could proclaim their right to have access to nuclear weapons in one way or another.

We already hear voices asking why, in addition to the NATO multilateral force, should not CENTO, SEATO and ANZUS multilateral forces be established? All this would appear to be logical and consistent. After all, if the plan to establish a NATO multilateral nuclear force is carried out, how can there be any objection to the establishment of other multilateral forces? Certainly it is difficult to deny that there is a certain amount of logic in such arguments. Indeed, other States in other parts of the world may draw up their own plans regarding nuclear weapons in accordance with, or taking into account, the experience of West Germany. Basing themselves on similar arguments to those of the present-day champions of the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force, other States in their turn may seek to acquire access to nuclear weapons in one way or another.

That is what the scheme to create a NATO multilateral nuclear force will lead to. The access of West Germany to nuclear weapons -- at first through a multilateral nuclear force -- will still further whet the appetite of the West German revenge-seekers who are striving to obtain complete possession of nuclear weapons. The participation of the West German Bundeswehr in the NATO multilateral nuclear force is only an intermediate step towards this goal.

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Nor should we close our eyes to the fact that the implementation of the plan to create a NATO multilateral nuclear force not only would not prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons, as the representatives of the Western Powers try to assure us, but on the contrary would be a form of access to nuclear weapons for those States which at present do not possess them, and thus would give an impetus to a further and even more dangerous round in the nuclear arms race, in which other States, or even groups of States, would be involved.

The representatives of the Western Powers in the Eighteen-Nation Committee --- the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Italy --- in trying to prove what cannot be proved: namely, that the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force would not entail dissemination of nuclear weapons, put forward the following reasons and arguments.

First, they assert that the West German armed forces will not be given access, speaking figuratively, to the firing trigger -- that is, to the actual machinery for setting nuclear weapons in action for combat use --, but will merely be given the opportunity to put their finger on the safety catch. In other words, within the framework of NATO West Germany will, so to speak, merely have the right to veto the utilization of nuclear weapons -- that is, their combat use. The absurdity of this thesis is obvious because, if that were really the case and if it were merely a question of giving West Germany, as a precautionary measure, the right to veto the utilization of nuclear weapons, then it is incomprehensible why it should be necessary to create a NATO multilateral nuclear force with the participation of West German military contingents. The right to veto the utilization of atomic weapons is essentially a political decision, and for such a decision the participation of West German military contingents in a NATO multilateral nuclear force is not required at all.

It is also impossible to justify from this point of view the presence of West German military contingents on board the destroyer "Biddle" for training in the use of nuclear weapons. Indeed, anyone is justified in asking whether the participation of West Germany in the multilateral nuclear force is limited to giving it the right

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to put its finger on the safety catch -- that is, to giving it the right to prevent, when it so wishes, the taking of a decision on the use of nuclear weapons; that is, to use its veto. For this purpose, as everybody realizes, there is no need at all for the training of West German military contingents in the techniques of the combat use of nuclear weapons; nor is there any need for the West German armed forces to be given nuclear missile combat training.

Comparing these facts and considerations, it is easy to see how false is the thesis of the Western Powers alleging that the creation of the NATO multilateral nuclear force, and the access by the West German Bundeswehr to nuclear weapons through this force, is a harmless measure aimed at preventing the possible utilization of nuclear weapons and not the opposite. This thesis of the Western Powers does not stand up to criticism; it falls to the ground when confronted with the facts of real life.

Secondly, the Western Powers, in their attempts to justify the creation of the NATO multilateral nuclear force and access by West Germany to nuclear weapons through it, have tried in every way to impress on us the idea that we ought not to fear the participation of West Germany in such a force. They have endeavoured to persuade us that by means of this force West Germany will be bound hand and foot and unable to act independently, and that the access of the West German Bundeswehr to nuclear weapons through the NATO multilateral force constitutes a guarantee for other States that West Germany will not represent for them a military danger or threat. This thesis of the Western Powers has been repeated many times by their representatives at meetings of the Committee and also outside its confines -- in the statements of responsible statesmen of the Western Powers.

However, this thesis likewise falls to the ground when confronted with the facts of actual life. It suffices to look at the events relating to Cyprus. The whole world is witnessing armed action by Turkey against the Republic of Cyprus. Recently the Turkish armed forces forming part of NATO have bombed a number of places in the territory of Cyprus. We have no intention of going into an assessment of the political significance of this action; it is not part of our task to do so. At present, in connexion with the plan to create a NATO multilateral nuclear force with the participation of the West German Bundeswehr, we are concerned with another aspect

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of the matter. We are concerned with the fact that the Turkish Air Force is part of the NATO air forces. We now know precisely that Cyprus was bombed and machine-gunned by jet aircraft forming part of Squadron 112 of NATO.

What conclusion follows from these facts of actual life? The conclusion is that the participation in NATO of any military units cannot be a guarantee that these units will not be used in the interests of this or that individual member of NATO. No one can guarantee that the West German revenge-seekers who are firmly entrenched in the Government and the Bundeswehr of the Federal Republic of Germany, once they have been given access to nuclear weapons through the NATO multilateral nuclear force, will abandon their revenge-seeking plans. On the ground of past experience it can be assumed that they will not stop at any extremes to accomplish their plans, which may lead to an outbreak of nuclear war.

It is well known that, after the armed forces of the United States, the West German armed forces at present rank second in size and strength amongst the NATO forces, and in Europe these West German forces may be said to hold a predominant position. Their influence and importance are growing continually and if the plan for the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force is carried out, the powerful armed forces of West Germany will undoubtedly become the decisive, dominating power in the NATO military alliance. If even such a comparatively weak country as Turkey did not hesitate to use NATO military forces at its own discretion to accomplish its political aims and ambitions, would anyone be so naive as to believe in the meekness and peaceful nature of the West German revenge-seekers once they have obtained access to nuclear weapons through the NATO multilateral force?

It is obvious that nobody will believe that fairy-tale. The events in Cyprus are merely an eloquent illustration of the possible development of events when individual members of NATO avail themselves of the armed forces of NATO, regardless of whether they are multilateral or multinational, or whatever else they may be called, in order to accomplish their own aims and ambitions. Those events emphasize even more forcibly the danger and political recklessness of the plan to create a NATO multilateral nuclear force, through which the West German revenge-seekers would be able to gain access to nuclear weapons.

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In general, from whatever angle the representatives of the Western Powers have attempted to approach the matter, in their efforts to reconcile the plan to create a NATO multilateral nuclear force with the idea of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, all their arguments have proved to be untenable. We have endeavoured to go into the problem in the most detailed manner. We have carried out a thoroughly objective analysis of the position of the Western Powers and, in the first place, of course, the position of the United States in all this affair, and we have to recognize with regret that in this regard the United States is playing a double game. While its representatives in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament continue to assure us that the United States is against the dissemination of nuclear weapons, outside the Committee it signs agreements to transmit to its NATO allies, including the Federal Republic of Germany, a wider range of information on nuclear weapons. West German naval officers and ratings are already aboard the destroyer "Biddle" for the purpose of being trained in the techniques and use of nuclear weapons.

In this regard the Tass statement which I have already mentioned states the following:

"Of course, such a divergence between words and deeds does not testify to the sincerity of the United States approach to the solution of so important a problem as the prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons. It turns out that while they say they are in favour of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, the United States politicians are at the same time consolidating juridically, in treaty form, the possibilities for its dissemination." (ENDC/138, p.3)

Obviously such a course of action can only be condemned. By acting in that way the Governments of the United States and other NATO countries are assuming a heavy responsibility in the eyes of the peoples of the world. The policy of the United States aimed at making, together with the Federal Republic of Germany and other members of NATO, joint preparations for nuclear war is the main obstacle to the conclusion of such an agreement. That policy should be changed.

The peoples of the world realize perfectly well the threat involved in the dissemination of nuclear weapons and the urgent need to work out an agreement that would contribute to the elimination of that threat. There is every possibility to do so; all that is needed is good will on the part of the Western Powers and in the first place, of course, the United States.

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In concluding, I should like once again, on behalf of the Soviet delegation, to appeal to all members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to set to work without any further delay on a practical solution of the problem of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons -- such a solution as would shut off all possibilities of access to nuclear weapons for those States which do not now possess them.

Such a solution should provide that the nuclear Powers shall give an undertaking not to transfer to non-nuclear Powers nuclear weapons and technical information necessary for their production.

Such a solution should also provide for a commitment by the non-nuclear Powers not to manufacture and not to acquire nuclear weapons from other States, and also not to obtain technical information for their production.

Such a solution should also contain clear provisions precluding the possibility of granting access to nuclear weapons to States not possessing them, through military alliances, whether indirectly through the access of their military personnel to such weapons within the joint armed forces of such alliances, or through the participation of non-nuclear States in the possession, disposition and control of such weapons.

That would be a comprehensive agreement on the prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons, the conclusion of which is awaited with so much hope by the peoples of the world. The Soviet Union is prepared to sign such an agreement this very day. It is now up to the Western Powers and, above all, the United States, to take the next step.

Lastly, I should like to mention that we listened with great attention to the statement made today by the representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Hassan, and were most interested in his ideas and suggestions. Above all we welcome, and we note with deep satisfaction, the decision taken by the leaders of the African States and Governments at the Cairo Conference, at which the African States expressed themselves ready to conclude, under the aegis of the United Nations an agreement renouncing the production of nuclear weapons and the acquisition of control over such weapons. There is no doubt that this resolution represents a substantial step forward on the road to the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons and towards lessening the threat of thermonuclear war.

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Mr. Hassan also proposed three measures to help overcome the difficulties that have arisen in our negotiations. We highly appreciate this attempt by the United Arab Republic to help to widen the possibilities of agreement on such an important and urgent question as the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. We shall study very attentively and carefully the considerations put forward by Mr. Hassan today, and shall make known our views on them in due course.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 207th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador U Sain Bwa, representative of Burma.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United Arab Republic, Italy, the United States and the Soviet Union.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 18 August 1964, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.